Catholic University Law Review
Volume 62
Issue 1 Fall 2012

Article 5

2012

Take the Money and Split: The Current Circuit Split and Why
Actual Force and Violence or Intimidation Should Not Be Required
Under Section 2113(a) of the Bank Robbery Act
Kaitlin Flynn

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kaitlin Flynn, Take the Money and Split: The Current Circuit Split and Why Actual Force and Violence or
Intimidation Should Not Be Required Under Section 2113(a) of the Bank Robbery Act, 62 Cath. U. L. Rev.
175 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol62/iss1/5

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

Take the Money and Split: The Current Circuit Split and Why Actual Force and
Violence or Intimidation Should Not Be Required Under Section 2113(a) of the
Bank Robbery Act
Cover Page Footnote
J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 2007, Johns
Hopkins University. Thank you to the members of the Catholic University Law Review for their time,
energy, and hard work given to this Comment. I would like to thank Kerry and Nick for their love, patience,
and encouragement. A special thank you to my parents who inspire me with their tireless support and
love, for which I am eternally grateful.

This comments is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol62/iss1/5

TAKE THE MONEY AND SPLIT: THE CURRENT
CIRCUIT SPLIT AND WHY ACTUAL FORCE AND
VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION SHOULD NOT BE
REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 2113(A) OF THE
BANK ROBBERY ACT
Kaitlin N. Flynn+
“Why do you rob banks?”1 Thief answers: “Because that’s where the money
is.”2 As one of the FBI’s “most wanted”3 and commonly known as “Public
Enemy Number One,”4 John Dillinger once stated, “I guess my only bad habit
is robbing banks. I smoke very little and don’t drink much.”5 Between the fall
of 1933 and the summer of 1934, stories of the numerous and violent bank
robberies John Dillinger and his gang committed filled headlines.6 The
outbreak of the Depression Era bank robberies prompted Congress to pass the
Bank Robbery Act of 1934,7 which specifically focused on “gangsters who
operate habitually from one State to another in robbing banks.”8
The Bank Robbery Act of 1934 punished “certain offenses committed
against banks.”9 As originally enacted, however, the statute led to “some
incongruous results” because its scope was limited to robbery and did not
include larceny or burglary.10 Today, other inconsistencies exist, causing U.S.
courts of appeals to disagree on whether the Bank Robbery Act requires
+
J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2007, Johns Hopkins University. Thank you to the members of the Catholic University Law
Review for their time, energy, and hard work given to this Comment. I would like to thank Kerry
and Nick for their love, patience, and encouragement. A special thank you to my parents who
inspire me with their tireless support and love, for which I am eternally grateful.
1. ELLIOT J. GORN, DILLINGER’S WILD RIDE: THE YEAR THAT MADE AMERICA’S PUBLIC
ENEMY NUMBER ONE 129 (2009).
2. Id.
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION,
3. Famous
Cases
and
Criminals,
FED.
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/john-dillinger (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
4. G. RUSSELL GIRARDIN & WILLIAM J. HELMER, DILLINGER: THE UNTOLD STORY 52
(1994); GORN, supra note 1, at 123.
5. GORN, supra note 1, at 63; see GIRARDIN, supra note 4, at 109.
6. See Famous Cases and Criminals, supra note 3.
7. Bank Robbery Act of 1934, ch. 304, § 2, 48 Stat. 783 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 280 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that
the original 1934 Bank Robbery Act was created because of “bank robberies committed by John
Dillinger and others” (citing Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 102 (1943))).
8. S. REP. NO. 73-537, at 1 (1934) (quoting memorandum from the Department of Justice).
9. Bank Robbery Act of 1934, ch. 304, § 2.
10. H.R. REP. NO. 75-732, at 1–2 (1937).
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“actual” or “attempted” force and violence or intimidation to prosecute an
individual for attempted bank robbery.11
The first paragraph of the Bank Robbery Act, codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a), imposes liability upon,
[w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or
attempts to take, from the person or presence of another, or obtains
or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money or any other
thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control,
management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings
and loan association.12
The U.S. circuit courts disagree as to whether the word “attempts” applies to
“force and violence or . . . intimidation” or whether “attempts” only applies to
the taking of “property or money . . . belong[ing] to, or in the care of, . . . any
bank.” The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits agree
with the latter, holding that a conviction under § 2113(a) requires actual force
and violence or intimidation; attempted force is not enough to sustain a
conviction for attempted bank robbery under the statute.13 The U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits disagree, holding
that attempted force and violence or intimidation meets § 2113(a)’s statutory
requirements.14
This Comment examines the split among the circuits regarding the
application of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Part I of this Comment examines the
evolution of the crime of bank robbery. Part II discusses the current split
among the circuits on the issue of whether attempted force and violence, or
intimidation satisfies § 2113(a) for a conviction of attempted bank robbery and
addresses the reasons for the conflicting statutory interpretations. Part III
explains why § 2113(a) should be interpreted to require attempted force and
violence or intimidation. This analysis includes an examination of the plain
language of the statute, Congress’s intent when enacting the statute, and the
theory of deterrence. These principles demonstrate the need for the statute to
be construed so as to sustain convictions when attempted, not actual, force and
violence or intimidation is used.

11. See infra notes 13–14 and accompanying text; see also infra Part I.D.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006).
13. United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that “actual force
and violence or intimidation is required for a conviction under the first paragraph of § 2113(a),
whether the defendant succeeds (takes) or fails (attempts to take) in his robbery attempt”); United
States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2004) (coming to the same conclusion).
14. See United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Moore, 921
F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir.
1976).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE BANK ROBBERY ACT
A. The History and Adoption of Larceny in American Criminal Law
In England, the prohibition against larceny, or the wrongful taking of
another’s property, was developed out of a need to maintain social order, to
punish those who committed the offense, and to acknowledge the right of the
owner to use the item.15 Larceny consists of the following elements: (1) taking
or carrying away of property, (2) from another’s possession, and (3) with the
intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property.16 Larceny was first
enforced in England in the thirteenth century, but at that time, a person could
only be convicted for taking property from another’s actual possession.17
Larceny prohibited such takings because “violence was more likely when
property was taken from the owner’s actual possession.”18 The law continued
to expand, however, in recognition that the prohibition should not only reflect
a desire to prevent social harms, but should also hold paramount the protection
of personal property from permanent deprivation of ownership.19 As a result,
the law began to recognize additional types of larceny offenses, including
offenses when taking of property merely owned by another occurred or when
taking of property occurred by trickery.20 Many American jurisdictions have
taken these various types of theft offenses and combined them into one
crime.21
Robbery, a common law larceny-type offense, includes the required
elements of larceny in addition to assault on a person.22 Force or threat of

15. See Michael E. Tigar, The Right of Property and the Law of Theft, 62 TEX. L. REV.
1443, 1448 (1984); see also George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 469, 474 (1976) (stating that the crime of larceny was viewed as a socially undesirable
event because it disrupted social norms).
16. Mitchell v. United States, 394 F.2d 767, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
17. Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356, 358 (1983) (noting that the primary purpose of early
larceny laws was not to stop wrongful takings, but to prevent violence and breaches of the peace).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 359 (explaining that the history of larceny at common law was expanded to
include cases in which the owner merely possessed, as opposed to owned, the item).
20. Id.; see also Arthur R. Pearce, Theft by False Promises, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 967
(1953) (stating that the three types of “gentle theft” in American law are larceny, embezzlement,
and false pretenses).
21. CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 633
(2005); see also Model Penal Code § 223.1 (1980) (consolidating “conduct denominated theft”
like “unlawful taking, deception, extortion, theft of property lost, receiving stolen property, theft
of services and unauthorized use of automobiles” into a single offense).
22. United States v. W.T.T., 800 F.2d 780, 782–83 (8th Cir. 1986) (Oliver, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing Norris v. United States, 152 F.2d 808, 809 (5th Cir. 1946))
(defining robbery in the federal statute as the elements of larceny plus violence or “putting in fear
. . . at the time of the act or immediately preceding it” (emphasis omitted)).
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force elevates a larceny to a robbery.23 The Bank Robbery Act, codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2113, is the federal statute that applies to robberies and larcenies of
banks.24
B. The Enactment of the Federal Bank Robbery Act
Congress passed the original Bank Robbery Act in 193425 with the purpose
of putting an end to the violence and harm caused by the outbreak of bank
robberies during the Depression Era.26 The original Act only prosecuted
robbery, homicide during the commission of a robbery, and aggravated assault
that accompanied a robbery. In an attempt to prosecute crimes of a lesser
degree, Congress amended the statute in 1937 and again in 1948.27 The 1948
amendments created two paragraphs within § 2113(a): the first paragraph
restates the original Act, and the second paragraph incorporates the crime of
larceny by prohibiting unlawful entry.28 The statute penalizes an individual for
unlawfully taking, or attempting to take, property from the bank by force and
violence or intimidation.29
23. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 275 (2000) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (noting the
added requirements of robbery—that it was an “aggravated form of larceny” whereas “larceny
was a lesser included offense of robbery”); Danielle R. Newton, Comment, What’s Right with a
Claim-of-Right, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 673, 676 (1999) (stating that the only difference between
robbery and larceny is the use of force in the former).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2006). Although some jurisdictions apply common law, all federal
crimes are statutorily based. See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104–05 (1943)
(explaining that there are no common law criminal offenses against the United States); see also
Patricia E. Lee, Bank Robber Act: Fraud or Larceny, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 656, 656 (1982).
25. Bank Robbery Act of 1934, ch. 304, § 2, 48 Stat 783 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113).
26. 78 CONG. REC. 8148 (1934) (statement of Sen. David Glover) (“The robbing of banks
and killing of people for the purpose of taking away money deposited by citizens and those
engaged in banking is a crime that should be severely punished, and this bill provides a
punishment that will deter anyone from attempting bank robbery of this kind.”).
27. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 796 (1948) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006). The statute provides,
Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the
person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any
property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody,
control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan
association; or
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan
association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit union, or as a
savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank, credit union, or in
such savings and loan association, or building, or part thereof, so used, any felony
affecting such bank, credit union, or such savings and loan association and in violation
of any statute of the United States, or any larceny—
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
Id.
29. Id.
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C. The Attempt Doctrine
Under § 2113(a), an individual can be prosecuted not only for actual bank
robbery, but attempted bank robbery.30 At common law, an attempted crime
requires (1) the specific intent to commit the crime, and (2) an “overt act” or
“substantial step” towards the commission of the crime.31 This definition does
not allow “mere preparation” to satisfy the requirements of attempt crimes.32
Moreover, this definition of attempt leads to the common law standard that
attempt crimes require specific intent.33 This common law notion has carried
over into statutory law and into judicial interpretation of federal criminal
statutes.34
The heightened requirement of a culpable mental state in attempt crimes
exists to ensure that a person involved in purely innocent conduct cannot be
convicted of attempting to commit a crime.35 While protecting innocent
conduct is valuable, it is also important to prevent a “substantial step” or “overt
act” towards the commission of a crime from occurring.36
30. Id.
31. United States v. Sarbia, 367 F.3d 1079, 1085 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Arbelaez,
812 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1987) (listing the two elements of attempt as “(1) intent to engage in
the criminal conduct and (2) an overt act which is a substantial step towards commission of the
crime”).
32. Sarbia, 367 F.3d at 1087 (quoting State v. Lung, 28 P. 235, 236–37 (Nev. 1891))
(explaining that a conviction for attempt cannot be sustained if the activity is mere preparation;
rather, there must be “direct movement” toward the commission of a crime after the preparations
are made).
33. See United States v. Sneezer, 900 F.2d 177, 179 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that specific
intent is a necessary element in attempt crimes); see also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,
405 (1980) (stating that crimes, such as an attempt crime, require a “higher level” of culpability in
order to distinguish innocent behavior from wrongful behavior); Paul H. Robinson & Jane A.
Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35
STAN. L. REV. 681, 748–49 (1983).
34. United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
Congress’s use of the word “attempt” requires that a defendant have the “specific intent to
commit the attempted crime, even when the statute [does] not contain an explicit intent
requirement”); United States v. Darby, 857 F.2d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that attempted
bank robbery requires specific intent and to prove attempted bank robbery, prosecutors must
“prove that the defendant intended to take the property by force, violence or intimidation”). But
see United States v. Johnston, 543 F.2d 55, 57–58 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that specific intent is
not an element of attempted bank robbery under the first paragraph of § 2113(a)).
35. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d at 1193 (explaining that the purpose of a more stringent
mental state requirement in attempt crimes is to ensure that the conduct being punished is “truly
culpable”); see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, The Economics of the Law of Criminal
Attempts: A Victim-Centered Perspective, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 299, 318 (1996) (discussing how
the criminal justice system punishes completed crimes more harshly than attempted crimes, and
that certain preparation to commit a crime is not to be punished).
36. United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (1976) (providing that “[a]ttempt is a
subtle concept that requires a rational and logically sound definition, one that enables society to
punish malefactors who have unequivocally set out upon a criminal course without requiring law
enforcement officers to delay until innocent bystanders are imperiled”); see also Robert E.

180

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 62:175

The Model Penal Code’s policy underlying attempt crimes focuses on the
“desire to punish those with clear criminal intent, to deter future crimes, and to
protect witnesses.”37 Conversely, federal attempt crimes are largely
non-existent, and Congress has only explicitly allowed for their prosecution in
certain federal statutes.38 Therefore, despite the wide use of attempt crimes in
state law, many federal criminal statutes fail to provide sanctions for
attempting to commit a crime.39 The Bank Robbery Act is one such exception.
D. The Discordant Analyses of Attempted Bank Robbery Under the Bank
Robbery Act
The U.S. Courts of Appeals disagree on whether actual force and violence
or intimidation is necessary or whether attempted force and violence or
intimidation suffices to sustain a conviction for attempted bank robbery under
the first paragraph of § 2113(a). The minority view, held by only the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits, requires actual force and violence or intimidation to sustain a
conviction.40 In contrast, the majority of circuits hold that a defendant’s
attempt to use force and violence or intimidation is enough to sustain a
conviction for attempted bank robbery.41
1. The Minority View: Requiring Actual Force and Violence or Intimidation
There are two main cases that demonstrate the essence of the minority view:
United States v. Bellew and United States v. Thornton.42

Wagner, A Few Good Laws: Why Federal Criminal Law Needs a General Attempt Provision and
How Military Law Can Provide One, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1043, 1051–52 (2010); Herbert
Wechsler et al., The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law
Institute: Attempt, Solicitation and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 575 (1961) (explaining
that attempt, as defined under the Model Penal Code, requires that “[t]he actor . . . have for his
purpose to engage in the criminal conduct or accomplish the criminal result that is an element of
the substantive crime”).
37. Jennifer M. Lota, Comment, Analyzing 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) of the Federal Bank
Robbery Act: Achieving Safety and Upholding Precedent Through Statutory Amendment, 7
SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 445, 466 (2011) (citing Model Penal Code § 5.01 (Tent. Draft No. 10
1960)).
38. Wagner, supra note 36, 1052–53 (2010) (explaining that the inconsistencies in federal
law regarding the definition of attempt have led to confusion, and in some cases, to the inability
to convict certain wrongful actions).
39. Id.
40. See United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bellew,
369 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2004).
41. See United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Moore, 921
F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir.
1976).
42. Thornton, 539 F.3d at 746; Bellew, 369 F.3d at 454 (explaining that the attempt
language in § 2113(a) only relates to the taking).
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In United States v. Bellew, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
explicitly re-affirmed its position that the first paragraph of § 2113(a) requires
actual force and violence or intimidation.43 In Bellew, the defendant went into
a bank wearing a wig and carrying a briefcase containing a weapon and a
demand note.44 When the defendant requested to meet with the manager of
the bank, the bank staff asked him to wait.45 While waiting, the defendant
started acting strangely: he left the bank, returned, and again asked for the
manager.46 This suspicious behavior caused the bank staff to report the
defendant to the police.47 The court firmly held that the defendant could not be
convicted of attempted bank robbery under the first paragraph of § 2113(a)
because the defendant did not use actual force and violence or intimidation,
even if he had attempted to use such force.48 In so doing, the court explicitly
rejected the approach taken by other circuits, stating, “[w]e, therefore, reject
the opposing interpretation given this text by our sister circuits.”49 Instead, the
Fifth Circuit relied on many previous decisions from within the circuit to
support its decision50 that actual force and violence or intimidation is necessary
to sustain a conviction under § 2113(a).51 In reaching its holding, the court
specifically noted that the “‘actual act of intimidation’ reading [is] . . . the most
natural reading of the text.”52
Similarly, in United States v. Thornton, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit found that actual force and violence or intimidation was

43. Bellew, 369 F.3d at 453–54 (finding that the most accurate reading of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a) requires an “actual act of intimidation”); see also infra note 50.
44. Bellew, 369 F.3d at 451.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 451–52 (explaining that upon noticing the police, the defendant ran to his car and
put a gun to his own head, but was taken into custody after a three-hour stand-off).
48. Id. at 455. The court remanded the case for acquittal because the strange behavior and
apparent disguise was not enough, in the court’s view, to be intimidating. Id.
49. Id. at 454 (disagreeing with other circuits that hold that attempted force and violence or
intimidation satisfies § 2113(a) by interpreting the first paragraph of § 2113(a) to require only
actual force and violence or intimidation).
50. Id. (citing United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Baker, 17 F.3d 94, 96 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. McCarty, 36 F.3d 1349, 1357 (5th Cir.
1994); United States v. Van, 814 F.2d 1004, 1005–06 (5th Cir. 1987)).
51. Id.; see Burton, 126 F.3d at 670 (enumerating “[use of] force and violence or
intimidation” as one of the requirements for a conviction under § 2113(a)); Baker, 17 F.3d at
95–97 (finding that the intimidation element of § 2113(a) was met when the defendant, a small,
unarmed 11-year-old, gave the teller a note that threatened “to make [the bank] . . . red with
blood”); McCarty, 36 F.3d at 1357 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that a reasonable jury could have
concluded that actual intimidation existed when the defendant walked into a bank wearing
abnormal clothing and presented a note explaining it was a bank robbery).
52. Bellew, 369 F.3d at 454 (focusing on a literal reading of the first paragraph of
§ 2113(a)).
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required to convict an individual of attempted bank robbery.53 In Thornton,
the defendant made extensive preparations for a bank robbery, including
drawing sketches of the bank’s layout, and obtaining a gun as well as an old
license plate, and a disguise.54 On the day of the robbery, the defendant
reached the door of the bank, wearing dark clothes with a bandana covering the
lower portion of his face.55 However, a patron noticed him, causing the
defendant to panic and leave the scene without opening the door of the bank.56
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit addressed whether the district court erred in
instructing the jury that actual force and violence or intimidation was not
required to violate the statute.57 The court, examining only the statutory
language of § 2113(a),58 held that attempt under § 2113(a) “relates only to the
taking and not to the intimidation.”59 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that
actual force and violence or intimidation is required in order to sustain a
Because the defendant’s actions were
conviction under § 2113(a).60
insufficient to show actual intimidation in violation of § 2113(a), the court
reversed the conviction.61
In reaching their holdings, both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits cited to
United States v. Baker, a “widely-cited”62 1955 case from the U.S. District
53. United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting the split in
circuits regarding whether actual intimidation is required and following the Fifth Circuit’s
holding in Bellew).
54. Id. at 743 (describing the defendant’s disguises, which included a bald cap, makeup to
change the defendant’s complexion, a full beard, and a pillow to make him appear heavier).
55. Id. When the patron first saw the defendant, they made eye contact, which scared the
defendant. Id. The patron then walked up to the defendant and asked him what he was doing. Id.
The defendant immediately panicked, cursed the patron, and ran from the bank. Id.
56. Id. (describing the defendant’s panic as he began to curse at the patron, the patron’s fear
in response, and the patron’s subsequent denial that he saw anything suspicious).
57. Id. at 745 (noting that the district court’s jury instruction stated, among other things,
“[t]o sustain the charge of attempted bank robbery . . . the government must prove . . . that the
defendant attempted to take from the person or presence of another money belonging to and in the
care, custody, control, management, or possession of Bank One . . . [and that] the defendant acted
to attempt to take such money by force and violence or by intimidation” (emphasis added)).
58. Id. at 747 (finding that the court must adhere to the statute’s plain language because it is
clear and unambigious).
59. Id. (noting that this conclusion is derived from a “straightforward reading of
§ 2113(a)”).
60. Id. The court explicitly disagreed with the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits,
which have held that attempted force and violence or intimidation is enough. Id. (citing United
States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207 (9th Cir.
1990); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jackson, 560
F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977)).
61. Id. at 749–51 (holding that although the patron may have been scared of the defendant,
there was not enough evidence to prove actual intimidation—the defendant never entered the
bank and never demanded the money; therefore, there was no actual intimidation).
62. United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 540, 455 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v.
Baker, 129 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. Cal. 1955), abrogated by Moore, 921 F.2d 207).
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Court for the Southern District of California.63 In Baker, the defendant robbed
the bank by writing a note to the teller of the bank, which said, “Please check
all, into this sack. Thank you, ECB.”64 The court stated, without any citation,
that “[i]t is apparent that in the statute . . . the word ‘attempt’ related to the
taking and not to the intimidation.”65 Following this analysis, the court found
the defendant guilty because there was actual intimidation in the attempted
taking.66
Recently, two federal district courts in Rhode Island and Pennsylvania have
also held that actual force and violence or intimidation is required to satisfy the
first paragraph of § 2113(a).67 The Courts of Appeals for the First and Third
Circuits, which have jurisdiction over the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
district courts respectively, have never explicitly addressed whether actual or
attempted force and violence or intimidation meets the statutory requirements
in § 2113(a).68 Both district courts acquitted the defendant of attempted bank
robbery because they found that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate
the use of actual force and violence or intimidation.69
2. The Majority View: Attempted Force and Violence or Intimidation
Satisfies § 2113(a)
Unlike the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have concluded that an attempt to
use force and violence or intimidation is sufficient to sustain a conviction
under § 2113(a).70
63. 129 F. Supp. 684; see Thornton, 539 F.3d at 746 (citing Baker, 129 F. Supp. at 686).
64. Baker, 129 F. Supp. at 687 (describing that when the teller questioned the defendant
about the note’s meaning, he responded, “[r]ead it again; do as I say and there won’t be any
trouble”).
65. Id. at 686 (holding that attempted bank robbery is an “attempted taking by intimidation,
the means being intimidated”).
66. Id. at 687 (observing that the defendant “intended to get the money from the teller by
intimidation . . . [and] [t]hat the teller called for help shows an awareness on her part of the
defendant’s intention”).
67. United States v. Corbin, 709 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D.R.I. 2010); United States v. Smith,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2009).
68. Corbin, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (noting that the First Circuit has not directly addressed
whether § 2113(a) required actual force and violence or intimidation); Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77588, at *4 (“The Third Circuit has yet to have occasion to comment on this
issue . . . .”).
69. Corbin, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 160 (ruling that § 2113(a) requires actual force and violence
or intimidation and concluding that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that force and violence or intimidation existed); Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *26
(finding that no reasonable juror could find that the defendant’s actions of sitting in a parked car
in front of a bank with masks and BB guns could meet the requirement of actual force and
violence or intimidation).
70. United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 618 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Moore, 921
F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1984);
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was the first federal circuit
court to hold that attempted force and violence or intimidation met the
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).71 In United States v. Stallworth, the
Second Circuit was not persuaded by the defendants’ defense that they could
not be convicted of attempted bank robbery because they did not enter the bank
or carry any weapons.72 The defendants were apprehended before entering the
bank because one of the co-conspirators allowed law enforcement to install a
recording device in the car in exchange for immunity on prosecutions for four
other bank robberies.73 The court analyzed the attempted bank robbery in a
two-step analysis.74 First, the court determined whether the defendants had the
specific intent to commit bank robbery.75 Second, the court considered
whether the defendants had taken substantial steps toward the commission of
the crime.76 Under this two-step analysis, the court upheld the conviction of
attempted bank robbery.77
The following year, in United States v. Jackson, the Second Circuit
reaffirmed its holding in Stallworth and found that the defendants satisfied the
first paragraph of § 2113(a) by attempting force and violence or intimidation
during the commission of an attempted bank robbery.78 In Jackson, the
defendants planned to rob a bank early on Monday morning to steal the
weekend deposits.79 The original plan failed because the group arrived too late
to enter with the manager; however, the defendants were persistent and
obtained a fourth accomplice and re-planned the bank robbery for the
following week.80 During the course of the week, one member of the group
was arrested on a separate bank robbery charge and began to cooperate with
United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116–17 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Stallworth, 543
F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir. 1976).
71. Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040–41.
72. Id. at 1040 (denouncing the defendants’ argument that they had not acted in a way that
violated 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) because they had never entered the bank or brandished any
weapons).
73. Id. at 1039 (noting that the arrested individual agreed to cooperate with the FBI in order
to avoid prosecution for four armed bank robberies that occurred between June and September
1975).
74. Id. at 1040 (analyzing the elements of attempted bank robbery based on the “classic
elements of an attempt”).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1041 (highlighting the defendants’ “substantial steps that strongly corroborate[]
their criminal intent,” including inspecting the bank, obtaining ski masks, roofing nails, and
weapons, and stuffing gasoline-soaked newspaper into the car to burn it after the robbery).
77. Id. (explaining that the only things standing between the defendants and the bank
robbery were the law enforcement officers who stopped the crime and holding that any
reasonable jury could find that the preparation was complete).
78. 560 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that the district court “anticipated the precise
analysis which this Court adopted in the strikingly similar Stallworth case”).
79. Id. at 114.
80. Id.
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law enforcement.81
The group, without the recently arrested
co-conspirator, proceeded to the bank and tried to execute their plan.82 When
they realized that they were being watched by law enforcement, the defendants
decided not to approach the bank.83 The court, nevertheless, found them guilty
under the first paragraph of § 2113(a) because there was evidence that they had
the requisite intent to commit the bank robbery, and they took the required
substantial step to fall within the scope of § 2113(a).84
Similarly, in United States v. Wesley, the Sixth Circuit held that “[a]ctual
intimidation is not required to prove attempted bank robbery under the first
paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).”85 In Wesley, the defendant worked with an
accomplice who was responsible for the getaway car, but unbeknownst to the
defendant, his accomplice was working with the police.86 The accomplice
allowed the police to install listening devices in the car to record the
conversations between the accomplice and the defendant.87 The conversations
included information about wearing nylons over their faces, carrying guns, and
the role of the accomplice as the getaway driver.88 As part of their scheme, the
defendant and the accomplice drove around the bank to plan the exact method
of attack, but did not commit the robbery that day.89 The police, fearing that
the bank robbery was imminent and that the defendant had become suspicious
of the accomplice, arrested the defendant at his home.90 The defendant argued
that his conviction under the first paragraph of § 2113(a) should be reversed
because he did not use actual force and violence or intimidation—he never
approached or tried to enter the bank.91 The court disagreed with the
81. Id. at 115 (observing that the recently arrested co-conspirator told the federal agents that
she suspected that the bank robbery would take place without her because the other conspirators
feared that agents would be watching her).
82. Id. at 114–15 (discussing how the defendants realized that they were being watched by
law enforcement officers while they were driving around the bank and describing their failed
attempt to speed away).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 120–21 (finding that the defendants’ criminal intent was “beyond dispute” and that
their substantial steps towards the commission of the crime were evidenced by reconnoitering at
the bank and possessing paraphernalia to commit the crime, such as weapons and disguises).
85. 417 F.3d 612, 618–19 (6th Cir. 2005).
86. Id. at 615 (describing the cooperation between the accomplice, Deborah Reid, and the
police).
87. Id. (explaining the need for three people to accompany the robber in the bank: one to
watch the bank floor, a second to deal with the tellers, and a third to handle the vault).
88. Id. (outlining the defendant’s plan for the bank robbery that never actually occurred).
89. Id. at 616 (describing the taped discussion in the car in which the defendant and the
accomplice noted that they could see that the vault was open from the street, but that they did not
have the other accomplices with them to actually commit the robbery that day).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 617. In fact, the court held that this argument was waived because it was heard
for the first time on appeal. Id. However, the court still analyzed the defendant’s argument,
“even if the issue had not been waived.” Id. at 618.
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defendant, noting that “actual intimidation is not required to prove attempted
bank robbery.”92
In a factually similar case to Wesley, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit also held that attempted force and violence or intimidation satisfied
§ 2113(a).93 In United States v. Moore, an informant told law enforcement that
the defendant planned to rob a bank.94 Law enforcement officers observed the
defendant and others, including the informant, walk toward the bank wearing
ski masks and carrying gloves, two pillowcases, and a concealed weapon.95
On appeal, the defendant argued that there was inadequate evidence to convict
him of attempted bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) because he was
arrested before he even entered the bank and, thus, did not exhibit actual force,
violence or intimidation.96 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that
“[c]onviction under section 2113 requires only that the defendant intended to
use force, violence or intimidation and made a substantial step toward
consummating the robbery.”97 The court reaffirmed the conviction, holding
that a reasonable juror could have found that the defendant committed a
substantial step towards the commission of the bank robbery and had a
culpable intent to rob the bank.98
In reaching their holding, all of the majority circuits focus on the
requirements of an attempt crime.99 These courts apply the two-tiered analysis

92. Id. at 616, 618 (citing United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1990); United
States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d
1038, 1040 (2d Cir. 1976)).
93. Moore, 921 F.2d at 209.
94. Id. at 208.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 209 (noting the defendant’s argument that “the government cannot prove a
necessary element of the charge”).
97. Id. (citing United States v. Snell, 627 F.2d 186, 187–88 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1977)).
98. Id. (explaining that the informant’s information about the planned bank robbery,
coupled with the defendant’s walk toward the bank with a loaded weapon, ski mask, and gloves,
demonstrated culpable intent and a substantial step). The Fourth Circuit came to the same
conclusion in United States v. McFadden, stating “[i]t holds that the attempt relates to the taking
and not the intimidation.” 739 F.2d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 1984). In McFadden, the defendant
alleged that his conviction could not stand under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) because he did not use
force, violence or intimidation, as required under the statute. Id. at 150 (describing how the
defendants hid disguises and weapons in the shrubbery around the bank, but they were caught
before they could use them). The court, using the Stallworth two-step analysis, found that there
was sufficient evidence to convict both defendants under the Bank Robbery Act because the
evidence showed the culpability required for the crime of attempted bank robbery and a
substantial step towards the crime. Id. at 152 (stating that the defendants planned the robberies,
met and surveyed the specific location, brought weapons, and had a getaway driver and vehicle
ready to go).
99. See United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040–41 (2d Cir. 1976).
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first discussed in Stallworth to find defendants that fail to enter the bank,100 or
even approach the bank, guilty of attempted bank robbery because of their
requisite intent and because they took a substantial step toward the commission
of a bank robbery.101
II. ATTEMPTED FORCE AND VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION SHOULD
SATISFY 18 U.S.C. § 2113(A)
A. The Overarching Purpose of the Statute or a Strict Reading?
The circuit split evidences the two different approaches courts have taken
when analyzing an attempt under the Bank Robbery Act. The Fifth and
Seventh Circuits narrowly read the first paragraph of § 2113(a),102 while the
majority circuits take a much broader approach that focuses on legislative
intent.103
Specifically, the majority circuits analyze the overarching purpose of
attempt crimes when criminalizing attempted use of force and violence or
intimidation. For example, in Jackson, the Second Circuit rejected the
minority approach as “wooden logic,” observing that “[t]hey argue that their
activities did not transcend a hypothetical fixed point on a spectrum of conduct
culminating in the substantive offense of bank robbery.”104 Instead, the
majority circuits examine attempted bank robberies under the two-tiered
Stallworth analysis that focuses on the purpose of attempt crimes in general.105
For example, in reaching its holding in Stallworth, the Second Circuit
emphasized: “Attempt is a subtle concept that requires a rational and logically
sound definition, one that enables society to punish malefactors who have
unequivocally set out upon a criminal course without requiring law
enforcement officers to delay until innocent bystanders are imperiled.”106
Further, the majority circuits also emphasize that by failing to convict
defendants for attempted force and violence or intimidation as part of an
attempted bank robbery, inconsistencies in the purpose and rationale for
100. See, e.g., McFadden, 739 F.2d at 150 (defendant arrested while walking toward the
bank); Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040 (defendants arrested as they stepped out of their car, which
was parked near the bank).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 619 (6th Cir. 2005) (defendants
arrested days in advance of bank robbery).
102. See United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Bellew, 369 F.3d 450, 453–54 (5th Cir. 2004).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that “18
U.S.C. § 2113(a) specifically makes attempted bank robbery an offense” (footnote omitted)).
104. Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040.
105. See supra Part I.D.2; see also United States v. Corbin, 709 F. Supp. 2d. 156, 160 (D.R.I.
2010) (explaining that the Second Circuit’s analysis of § 2113(a) “did not examine the language
of the statute at all, but rather appeared to read ‘force and violence or by intimidation’ right out of
it to further the legitimate and laudable goals of crime prevention and protecting the public”).
106. Corbin, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 160 (quoting Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040).
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criminalizing bank robberies will result.107 Additionally, these courts stress
that waiting for the actual force and violence or intimidation to occur may put
innocent employees and bystanders in a precarious position with the potential
for injury or death.108
On the other hand, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits disagreed with the
majority circuits’ use of the general purpose of an attempt crime, noting, “we
do not find these cases persuasive because they omit an appropriate statutory
analysis.”109 Instead, these minority circuits follow a strict constructionist
approach that focuses on the placement of the word “attempt” within the
statute.110 Both circuits found support for their textual reading of the statue
from the Supreme Court case, Prince v. United States.111 According to these
circuits “[t]he attempt language only relates to the taking and not the
intimidation.”112 When analyzing the statutory text, the Seventh Circuit noted
that if Congress had intended for “attempt” to apply to force and violence or
intimidation, it would have written the statute to read: “Whoever attempts by
force and violence and intimidation to take . . . .”113 Reaching the same
conclusion, the Fifth Circuit parsed out the elements of § 2113(a) under “the
most natural reading of the text”:
(1) an individual or individuals (2) used force and violence or
intimidation (3) to take or attempt to take (4) from the person or
107. Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1041 (“Application of the foregoing [two-step attempt analysis]
to the instant case emphasizes the importance of a rule encouraging early police intervention
where a suspect is clearly bent on the commission of crime.”).
108. See United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that waiting
for actual force and violence or intimidation “would require that the lives of the bank employees,
the police, any innocent bystanders and the defendants themselves be endangered before the
arrest could be made”); Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1041 (“[Law enforcement’s] timely intervention
probably prevented not only a robbery, but possible bloodshed in an area crowded with noontime
shoppers.”); see also infra notes 145–48 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
preventing bank robberies by apprehending defendants before they actually use violence or
intimidation).
109. United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2008).
110. United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2004) (focusing on “the relevant
text itself”); Thornton, 539 F.3d at 747 (examining the statutory text of § 2113(a) and noting that
courts need to “simply read the text”).
111. Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 328 (1957).
It is a fair inference from the wording in the Act, uncontradicted by anything in the
meager legislative history, that the unlawful entry provision was inserted to cover the
situation where a person enters a bank for the purpose of committing a crime, but is
frustrated for some reason before completing the crime. The gravamen of the offense is
not in the act of entering, which satisfies the terms of the statute even if it is simply
walking through an open, public door during normal business hours. Rather the heart
of the crime is the intent to steal.
Id.
112. Thornton, 539 F.3d at 747.
113. Id. The actual language of the first paragraph of § 2113(a) states, “Whoever, by force
and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).

2012]

The Bank Robbery Act and the Circuit Split

189

presence of another (5) money, property, or anything of value
(6) belonging to or in the care, custody, control, management, or
possession (7) of a bank, credit union, or savings and loan
association.114
B. Applying the Cannons of Statutory Interpretation to § 2113(a)
The disagreement between the minority and majority circuits depends on
how broadly or narrowly one reads the statute. The difference, which in reality
boils down to one word,115 requires an in-depth analysis of the statute.
Statutory analysis begins with the textual reading of the statute.116 If that
language is not clear, then Congressional intent is examined.117
1. Construing the Statutory Text of § 2113(a)
Statutory analysis starts with the language of the statute itself.118 The
relevant language of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) states, “[w]hoever, by force and
violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take . . . .”119 When the
words in the statute are plain, they are given their ordinary and normal
meaning.120 Additionally, under the canon of noscitur a sociis, the words are
understood by the surrounding words.121 Because the statute distinguishes
completed taking from attempted taking,122 the statute prohibits attempts, and
there is room for interpretation as to whether the attempts apply to both the
taking of the money and in the force and violence or intimidation.123 The
ambiguity in the first sentence of § 2113(a), as to whether “attempt” modifies
the taking of the money, or if it also applies to the force and violence or
intimidation, is resolved once Congressional intent is examined.124
114. Bellew, 369 F.3d at 454 (emphasis added).
115. Thornton, 539 F.3d at 747 (7th Cir. 2008) (disagreeing about whether attempt relates to
the taking, or to both the taking and the force and violence or intimidation).
116. Bellew, 369 F.3d at 453 (citing Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 271 (2000)).
117. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 364 (2009 & Supp. 2012) (explaining that the canons of
construction are used to examine legislative intent and to reasonably interpret the statute to meet
the legislative purpose for its enactment).
118. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“It is elementary that the
meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is
framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its
terms.”).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006).
120. See Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485–86.
121. See EDGAR BODENHEIMER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM: READING AND CASES 168 (3d ed. 2001) (“[N]oscitur a sociis translates as ‘a
thing is knowing by its associates.’”).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006) (providing, “takes, or attempts to take . . .”).
123. See United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding the argument
that attempt only relates to the taking portion of § 2113(a) unconvincing, and instead applying the
two-tiered analysis of attempt crimes found in Stallworth).
124. See infra Part II.B.2 and III.A.–B.
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2. Congress’s Intent with the Bank Robbery Act
After the language of the statute is considered ambiguous, the next factor to
examine in statutory interpretation is congressional intent.125 The 1937
amendments to the Bank Robbery Act show that Congress intended to enact a
broad statute that would cover attempted force and violence or intimidation.126
The Bank Robbery Act was amended in 1937 due to the concern that
individuals successfully avoided prosecution, despite having stolen large sums
of money, because they did not fall under the narrow language of the statute.127
To correct this problem, the 1937 amendment broadened the statutory language
to ensure that all wrongful conduct of attempted or completed bank robbery
could be punishable.128 By narrowly interpreting the statute to require actual
force and violence or intimidation in order to convict an individual of
attempted bank robbery, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ holdings are contrary
to Congress’s intent of ensuring that all criminal activity related to bank
robberies would be punished.129
The passage of the Bank Robbery Act reflects Congress’s attempt to
explicitly define universally perceived wrongful conduct and to make it a
statutory offense.130 In its enactment of the Bank Robbery Act, Congress

125. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 543 U.S. 84, 93–94 (2001) (asserting that
canons of interpretation help judges to determine congressional intent from the statutory
language); see also 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 364 (2009 & Supp. 2012) (“The purpose of rules of
statutory construction is to discover the true intent of the statute.”).
126. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-732, at 1–2 (1937) (broadening the scope of punishable behaviors
that qualified as illegal under the Bank Robbery Act).
127. See id.
128. Id. (“The Attorney General has recommended the enactment of this proposed legislation
which is designed to enlarge the scope of the bank robbery statute . . . to include larceny and
burglary of the banks protected by this statute.”).
129. Interestingly, in reaching their conclusions, both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits
explicitly note that the defendants could have been charged under the second paragraph of
§ 2113(a), which criminalizes actual or attempted larceny during a bank robbery. See supra note
28 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“Thornton could have been prosecuted under the second paragraph of § 2113(a) so the
government is not without a law under which to seek conviction of defendants under similar
factual circumstances” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450, 452–53 (5th
Cir. 2004) (“Bellew was not indicted under the second paragraph of Section 2113(a), though it
appears that the facts would have supported such a charge.”). However, this recourse is not
beneficial for two important reasons. First, a conviction under the second paragraph of
§ 2113(a) carries a lighter sentence and cannot be a predicate for a firearm charge. See Thornton,
539 F.3d at 747. Second, an individual who is caught after taking a substantial step, but before he
has actually attempted to enter a bank, will not fit within the second paragraph’s purview. See,
e.g., United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 618 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that, unlike the
factual scenario with which the Fifth Circuit was faced, the defendant in Wesley could not be
convicted under the second paragraph because the police apprehended the defendant before he
actually attempted to enter a bank).
130. See United States v. Donahue, 948 F.2d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 1991).

2012]

The Bank Robbery Act and the Circuit Split

191

intended to codify a malum in se, or inherently evil, activity.131 However,
courts, by prohibiting the conviction of an individual who only uses attempted
force and violence or intimidation, dilute this statutory prohibition.132 Because
the conduct is inherently wrong and signifies an attempt to rob a bank, the
statute should apply whether the perpetrator attempts or successfully uses force
and violence or intimidation.133 Once the defendant demonstrates a substantial
step towards committing bank robbery, the defendant should be punished for
the natural and probable consequences of the action.134 The interpretation
given by the majority of the circuits follows Congress’s intent when passing
the Bank Robbery Act, and the narrow reading of the minority circuits fails to
unite the statutory language with its congressional purpose.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE OF CRIMINALIZING ATTEMPTED
FORCE AND VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION
A. The Purpose of Criminal Law Is Served when Attempted Force and
Violence or Intimidation Satisfies § 2113(a)
One of the main theories of punishment in American criminal law is
deterrence.135 Deterrence is a utilitarian principle centered on the basis that
punishment can be beneficial by dissuading individuals from committing

131. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-732, at 1–2 (1937) (describing the act of armed bank robbery as
“inherently and essentially evil”).
132. See Thornton, 539 F.3d at 747 (acknowledging the circuit split and deciding that the
plain language of § 2113(a) requires actual force and violence or intimidation to sustain a
conviction). Compare Bellew, 369 F.3d at 454 (requiring actual force and violence or
intimidation), with United States v. Baker, 129 F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (stating that
“attempt” in the statute only relates to the taking and not to the intimidation), abrogated by
United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1990).
133. See United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 151–52 (4th Cir. 1984) (explaining that
actions such as discussing plans for the robbery, reconnoitering at the bank, and gathering the
disguises and weapons may be grounds for a conviction of attempted bank robbery); United
States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116–17 (2d Cir. 1977) (concluding that the holding in United
States v. Stallworth precludes the defendant from successfully arguing that § 2113(a) requires
actual force and violence or intimidation); United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1041 (2d
Cir. 1976) (recognizing other courts that have convicted individuals for attempted bank robbery,
even when the robbers had not committed assault and had not entered the bank, and voicing the
importance of the “rational policies underlying the attempt doctrine”).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, 837 F.2d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 1988).
135. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 950 (2003); see also,
MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 104–05, 151
(1997) (explaining retributivism, another principle of criminal law, which is focused on punishing
the criminal because he deserves punishment).
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crimes.136 There are two types of deterrence: general and specific.137 The
purpose of general deterrence is to prevent individuals from acting in a
wrongful way by making society aware of the punishment for wrongful
conduct.138 The purpose of specific deterrence is to punish the wrongdoer, so
he or she suffers, and, as a result, will not repeat the criminal act.139 If the
person repeats the act, he or she will be punished again—and usually, more
severely.140 Section 2113(a) accomplishes both goals of general and specific
deterrence when attempted bank robberies satisfy the requirements of the
statute. It sends a clear message that bank robbery, through attempted or actual
violence or intimidation, is criminal and will be punished. This strong stance
will help deter future attempted bank robberies. In addition, the purpose of
punishing the wrongful conduct is satisfied.
Criminal liability should be determined by what the bank robber tried to
accomplish, and not by the success of his actions.141 If an individual tries to
rob a bank, with the intent to use actual force and violence or intimidation, but
fails, his or her criminal liability should not be negated.142 Reading the statute
in a way that precludes convicting such activity does not serve the principle of

136. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 482
(1999) (“Deterrence theory is utilitarian . . . in nature.”); see also Hon. Robert T. Altman, Letter
to the Editor, Hate Crime Legislation, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1998, at B6 (“We punish wrongdoers
in order to protect innocent people and to deter potential criminals.”).
137. See Wendy Imatani Peloso, Note, Les Miserables: Chain Gangs and the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1459, 1492 (1997) (explaining the difference
between general and specific deterrence, and noting that general deterrence focuses on preventing
anyone from committing the crime and specific deterrence seeks to prevent ex-offenders from
re-committing crimes).
138. See Drury Stevenson, To Whom Is the Law Addressed?, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 105,
159–61 (2003).
139. See Kahan, supra note 136, at 415 (1999) (referring to “deterrence” as “a policy aimed
at creating efficient behavioral incentives”); Robinson & Darley, supra note 135, at 954 (“[A]ny
system that can impose punishment can produce a credible deterrent ‘bite.’”).
140. See Kahan, supra note 136, at 425 (describing how the “deterrence theory focuses on
consequences” and, as such, will punish recidivists).
141. See Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm Under the
Code and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 727 (1988) (explaining that the rationale
for protection and allowing law enforcement to stop the crime before it is complete).
142. See United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1976) (distinguishing mere
preparation from attempt by noting that “the requirement that the objective acts of the defendant
evidence commitment to the criminal venture and corroborate the mens rea”); United States v.
Roundtree, 527 F.2d 16, 19–20 (8th Cir. 1975) (explaining that the Federal Bank Robbery Act is
comprehensive and intended to cover “aggressions” that occur in a bank robbery).
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deterrence.143 Instead, it may encourage the same bank robber to try again.144
Further, one fundamental purpose of criminal law is to allow the community
to condemn inappropriate actions.145 As early as 1784, English courts
recognized the attempt doctrine.146 The primary reason that the criminal justice
system criminalizes attempted criminal activity is to prevent the contemplated
act from occurring.147 Punishing an attempted bank robbery is important, in
particular, because innocent bank employees and bystanders could be injured
easily, even with an unsuccessful robbery.148 The purpose of the attempt
doctrine is to avoid this type of scenario.149 As such, an individual’s attempt to
use force and violence or intimidation should be criminalized and should
satisfy the first paragraph of § 2113(a).150 Requiring law enforcement to wait
until the force and violence or intimidation was complete in order to ensure
that the defendant can be convicted under the first paragraph of

143. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and
Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 27–28 (2005) (stating implicitly that deterrence requires guilt of the
defendant in order for deterrence to have its appropriate effect; if the defendant knows and
understands the wrongful conduct, the punishment will dissuade similar behavior from occurring
again).
144. See United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting that one
benefit of the attempt doctrine is to ensure that public safety and welfare are not disturbed). This
problem was most poignantly exemplified in United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450, 451–53 (5th
Cir. 2004). In Bellew, the defendant returned to the bank numerous times to try to speak with the
bank manager in an attempt to rob the bank. Id. at 451. Nonetheless, the court held that the
defendant could not be charged with attempted bank robbery because he did not actually
intimidate anyone. Id. at 453.
145. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (highlighting the importance of
legislatures defining criminal activity because the punishment represents the community’s moral
condemnation of wrongful conduct); Kahan, supra note 136, at 421.
146. Rex v. Scofield, Cald. Mag. Rep. 397, 402–03 (1784); see also Francis Bones Sayre,
Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 821, 833–36 (1928) (reviewing the English development of
attempt).
147. See Ashworth, supra note 141, at 727 (noting the importance of prevention in
minimizing the injury).
148. See United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 1984) (discussing the
danger of waiting to arrest the defendant until he or she has used actual force and violence or
intimidation); Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1041 (noting the potential danger to bank patrons).
149. Jerome Hall, Criminal Attempt – A Study of Foundations of Criminal Liability, 49 YALE
L.J. 789, 817 (1940) (explaining that the function of the attempt doctrine is to prevent criminal
activity from occurring by putting a halt to it in the early stages before the crime is in fact
committed).
150. See United States v. Roundtree, 527 F.2d 16, 19–20 (8th Cir. 1975) (“18 U.S.C. § 2113,
is a comprehensive statute containing special provisions for increased punishment for aggravated
offenses. It is intended to cover most of the aggressions that may arise from a bank
robbery . . . .”); contra Michael Rizzo, Casenote & Comment, The Need to Apply the “Plain
Meaning” Rule to the First Paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is “Plain”: A Bank Robber Must
Have Used Actual Force and Violence or Intimidation, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227, 228–29
(2009) (arguing that an attempt should not be punished under § 2113(a) based on the language of
the statute).
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§ 2113(a) would contradict the purpose of attempt crimes and the role of law
enforcement to protect society.151
B. Criminalizing Attempted Force and Violence or Intimidation Accomplishes
Congress’s Purpose for Enacting § 2113
Additionally, holding that attempted force and violence or intimidation
satisfies § 2113(a) matches the public policy goals of § 2113(a).152 The
congressional record clearly indicates that the purpose for enacting the Bank
Robbery Act was to prevent attempted and completed bank robberies.153 The
crime of attempted bank robbery requires that the defendant be convicted only
if there was sufficient evidence that he or she had the intent to rob the bank.154
For a successful bank robbery, it is immaterial for the law’s purpose to deter
this type of crime, regardless of whether there was actual or attempted force
and violence or intimidation, but for an attempted, but unsuccessful bank
robbery, the statutory interpretation is critical.155 A conviction should be
upheld if the defendant is prohibited from completing the bank robbery while
attempting to use force and violence or intimidation. By only criminalizing
those defendants who use actual force and violence or intimidation during an
attempted bank robbery, courts are severely limiting the number of defendants
who can be convicted. Such a stringent reading provides no recourse to
convict an individual who was caught before he ever walked inside the bank.156
C. Judicial Conformity Is Necessary to Ensure Consistent Prosecution
In order to create consistent federal law, the U.S. Supreme Court should
grant certiorari to address the issue of whether actual or attempted force and
violence or intimidation is required under the Bank Robbery Act.157
151. See Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040 (noting that the purpose of the attempt doctrine is to
stop a criminal before harm actually occurs).
152. See 78 CONG. REC. 8148 (1934) (statement of Sen. David Glover) (discussing that the
purpose of the federal Bank Robbery Act was to protect the employees of the bank as well as the
money the citizens’ put into the bank and noting that those who act in violation of the statute
should be severely punished).
153. Id. (describing all the dangerous weapons that could be used in a bank robbery and
deciding on the word “device,” which covers a wider range of ways in which a robber could
inflict harm on the bank).
154. See United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 118–19 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing the
purpose of attempt crimes and the importance of criminalizing an intent to commit bank robbery
when it is coupled with substantial steps); Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040 (noting the importance of
the defendant having the criminal intent to commit bank robbery).
155. 78 CONG. REC. 8148 (1934).
156. See supra note 129.
157. Generally, the U.S. Supreme Court resolves a circuit split by granting certiorari. See
Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347 (1991) (noting that certiorari is often granted when
there is a split among the courts of appeals regarding the interpretation of a federal law); see also
Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1575 (2008) (“The emphasis on
uniformity is most visible in the Supreme Court’s self-selected docket, which is dominated by
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Inconsistent applications of a federal statute can lead to a lack of predictability
and unequal application of the law, and undermine the legitimacy of the statute
itself.158 The need for uniformity in federal laws is highlighted through the
contradictory outcomes in the cases addressing § 2113(a).159 An explicit ruling
on this issue would eliminate an area of long-standing disagreement among the
circuits and ensure that all defendants will be prosecuted uniformly, regardless
of which jurisdiction they attempt to commit their crime.
IV. CONCLUSION
Currently, the circuit courts disagree on whether 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)
requires actual or attempted force and violence or intimidation. This unsettled
statutory interpretation and riff between the circuits has developed over the
course of more than half a century. However, as of yet, courts have not come
to a meaningful resolution. Nonetheless, a careful evaluation of Congress’s
intent when it enacted the Bank Robbery Act, coupled with an analysis of the
attempt doctrine, demonstrates the need to prosecute an individual for
attempted bank robbery when he attempted to, but did not actually, use force
and violence or intimidation.

cases raising issues over which the lower courts disagree.”). The importance of consistent
interpretation of federal statutes is part of the reason why the Supreme Court often grants
certiorari on circuit splits. See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 16B
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2d § 4004.1 (1996) (arguing that the
“[g]eneral public importance of the issues, and the need to secure infirmity of federal law, must
be the basic touchstones” for certiorari decisions). It is, however, wholly within the Supreme
Court’s discretion to grant certiorari. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some
Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judge’s Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1643 (2002)
(“We tend to take for granted that the United States Supreme Court has the discretionary power,
through its use of the writ of certiorari, to select the cases it wishes to decide.”).
158. See Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1257, 1264–65
(2011) (explaining that one purpose for the creation of the Supreme Court was to ensure
uniformity in laws).
159. Compare United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 619 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming
defendant’s conviction for attempted bank robbery despite being arrested an hour away from the
bank without a weapon or disguise), with United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741,
744–45, 749 (7th Cir. 2008) (dismissing defendant’s conviction for attempted bank robbery in
which the defendant, disguised and carrying a weapon, reached the front steps of the bank, but
left panicked after an encounter with a patron).
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